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PRIVATE LAW REMEDIES, HUMAN RIGHTS, 
AND SUPPLY CONTRACTS 
JENNIFER S. MARTIN* 
Implementation of company human rights policies through the supply chain 
necessarily includes access to the full range of contractual remedies.  Many 
corporations already have corporate human rights policies respecting a wide 
number of human rights that might be violated in the supply chain, yet having 
corporate policy is not akin to action.  To the extent commercial buyers implement 
corporate policies in supply chain contracts the contractual obligations are 
answerable for breach.  The Uniform Commercial Code and the UN Convention 
for the International Sale of Goods provide access to contractual remedies using a 
market-based remedial framework that would assist in curbing breaches arising 
from the use of forced or slave labor in international supply chains.  This Article 
provides an overview and analysis of available remedies for breach of a corporate 
human rights policy implemented in the supply chain.  Buyers have access to these 
remedies either through default or as specifically contracted for remedies, subject to 
the general notions disfavoring penal damages.  The Model Contract Clauses from 
the American Bar Association’s Working Group to Draft Human Rights 
Protections in International Supply Contracts operate to provide such alternate 
remedies to buyers implementing human rights policies as contractual supply 
chain obligations that operate consistently with the existing legal frameworks. 
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thank research assistants Jose De la Cruz, Renato Da Costa Almeida, Heidy Gonzalez, 
and Jikky Thankachan of St. Thomas University School of Law for their valuable work 
on this project.  The Author also wishes to thank Professor David Snyder (American 
University Washington College of Law) and Susan Maslow (Antheil Maslow & 
Macminn, LLP) for their leadership of the ABA Working Group and Christopher 
Johnson (Center for Justice, Rights & Dignity), Professor Sarah Dadush (Rutgers Law 
School), and Professor Stephen Sepinuck (Gonzaga University School of Law) for 
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INTRODUCTION 
Implementation of company human rights policies (“CHRPs”) 
through supply contracts necessitates access to remedies.  The fulfillment 
of contractual expectations through remedies is the very foundation of 
contract law,1 including transactions subject to Article 2 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code (“UCC”)2 and the United Nations (UN) Convention 
for the International Sale of Goods (“CISG”).3  The flexibility of remedies 
available under Article 2 permits its application in an “infinite” variety of 
business transactions, customs, and practices, which would presumably 
                                               
 1. JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 118 (5th ed. 2011). 
 2. See generally U.C.C. §§ 2-711–2-719 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2011). 
 3. See generally U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 
art. 74, Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CISG].  This Article will refer to 
provisions of the UCC and the CISG., but acknowledges that contracting parties may 
opt-out of the CISG.  Nevertheless, this Article will cite to key provisions of the CISG, 
particularly where the CISG provisions differ from the UCC. 
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include obligations arising from human rights policies included as part of 
the contractual obligations in a supply contract.4 
Despite the work of the UN and the proliferation of CHRPs, there 
have been continuing instances of human rights concerns in supply 
contracts.  Ongoing problems have led major buyers, including H&M, 
Walmart, and Gap, to pledge improvement in safety and conditions of 
workers abroad.5  The garment industry has not been alone in 
struggling with human rights concerns abroad; there are also reports 
of slavery in the fishing industry,6 child slave labor in the chocolate 
industry,7 armed groups benefitting from minerals,8 and concerns of 
child labor in tobacco farming9 that form just part of a long list of 
continuing and recurring concerns.10  Some have taken the position 
                                               
 4. See Grant Gilmore, On the Difficulties of Codifying Commercial Law, 57 YALE L.J. 
1341, 1341 (1948) (stating that draftsmen of general commercial legislation must 
consider an “infinite variety of business customs and practices” and that the then-newly 
proposed UCC covered a variety of different commercial practices). 
 5. Rachel Abrams, Retailers like H&M and Walmart Fall Short of Pledges to Overseas 
Workers, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/31/business/ 
international/top-retailers-fall-short-of-commitments-to-overseas-workers.html. 
 6. E.g., Ian Urbina, ‘Sea Slaves’:  The Human Misery that Feeds Pets and Livestock, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 27, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/27/world/outlaw-ocean-
thailand-fishing-sea-slaves-pets.html (noting that migrants from Cambodia and 
Myanmar are “sea slaves” on floating Thai labor camps). 
 7. See, e.g., Brent Kendall, Supreme Court Denies Nestle, Cargill, ADM Appeal in Slave Labor 
Case, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 11, 2016, 1:51 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/supreme-court-
denies-nestle-cargill-adm-appeal-in-slave-labor-case-1452526492 (documenting a class-
action lawsuit regarding forced child slaves who worked on cocoa fields in the Ivory Coast). 
 8. Joseph Ataman, EU Agrees on Measures Regulating Conflict Minerals, WALL ST. J. (June 
16, 2016, 2:51 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/eu-agrees-on-measures-regulating-
conflict-minerals-1466103065. 
 9. Alexandra Hall, Working in Tobacco Fields Can Make Kids Sick.  But They Still Need 
the Money, WASH. POST (Oct. 6, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/ 
magazine/working-in-tobacco-fields-can-make-kids-sick-but-they-still-need-the-money 
/2016/10/05/fb0892e8-754b-11e6-8149-b8d05321db62. 
 10. See generally Rothna Begum, “I Was Sold”:  Abuse and Exploitation of Migrant 
Domestic Workers in Oman, HUM. RTS. WATCH (2016), https://www.hrw.org/sites/ 
default/files/report_pdf/oman0716web.pdf; Aruna Kashyap, “Work Faster or Get Out”:  
Labor Rights Abuses in Cambodia’s Garment Industry, HUM. RTS. WATCH (2015), 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/03/11/work-faster-or-get-out/labor-rights-abuses-
cambodias-garment-industry; see also ABA, ABA MODEL BUSINESS AND SUPPLIER POLICIES 
ON LABOR TRAFFICKING AND CHILD LABOR (2014), https://www.americanbar.org/ 
content/dam/aba/administrative/business_law/aba_model_policies.pdf [hereinafter ABA 
MODEL POLICIES]. 
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that an international convention to combat concerns of human rights 
abuses in supply contracts is needed.11 
While there has been consideration of public interventions to combat 
human rights abuses, there has been little guidance on the right 
approach to private action and even less guidance on private remedies 
for human rights abuses, particularly with respect to contracting party 
behavior that conflicts with a buyer’s CHRP incorporated into supply 
contracts.  More specifically, a buyer is generally entitled to a recovery 
that places it in the position it would have been if full performance had 
occurred, so long as the recovery is not penal in nature.12  Yet, it might 
be questioned whether enforcement of CHRPs mandated in supply 
contracts can, or even should, be quantified by this type of measure.  
Tension exists between the remedial object of assuring the non-
breaching buyer the “benefit of the bargain” through access to 
contractual remedies for human rights violations in the supply chain 
and those who might advocate for greater responsibility for the buyer 
itself when human rights violations occur in the supply chain.13 
An example of the relationships (illustrated in Figure 1 below) and 
the impact private actors can have on the protection of human rights 
is in order.14  Suppose a commercial seller and buyer make a long-term 
supply contract for the purchase of soccer balls at $6 per ball.  The buyer, 
                                               
 11. Global Treaty ‘Only Realistic Way’ to Stop Supply Chain Abuse:  Rights Group, 
REUTERS (May 30, 2016, 10:51 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-labour-
regulations-rights/global-treaty-only-realistic-way-to-stop-supply-chain-abuse-rights-gro 
up-idUSKCN0YM06P. 
 12. U.C.C. § 1-305 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2011); see also CISG, supra note 
3, art. 74 (stating that damages “consist of a sum equal to the loss, including loss of profit”). 
 13. See generally Omri Ben-Shahar & Ariel Porat, The Restoration Remedy in Private Law, 
118 COLUM. L. REV. 1901, 1905–06 (2018) (arguing in favor of a “restoration remedy” to 
compensate underlying emotional harms); Sarah Dadush, Identity Harm, 89 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 863, 867–68 (2018) [hereinafter Dadush, Identity Harm] (arguing in favor of a greater 
power for consumers to pursue actions for identify harm to aid in corporate 
accountability); Sarah Dadush, The Law of Identity Harm, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 803, 804 (2019) 
[hereinafter Dadush, The Law of Identity Harm] (arguing that there is a deficit in private law 
recourse for harm suffered by those who would not ordinarily have access to a remedy). 
 14. See Philip Alston & J.H.H. Weiler, An ‘Ever Closer Union’ in Need of a Human 
Rights Policy, 9 EUR. J. INT’L L. 658, 720 (1998) (explaining the effect of privatization 
and deregulation on the importance of corporate human rights policies); William 
Bradford, Beyond Good and Evil:  The Commensurability of Corporate Profits and Human Rights, 
26 NOTRE DAME J.L., ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 141, 156–57 (2012) (noting most major 
corporations have codes of conduct); David Kinley & Junko Tadaki, From Talk to Walk:  
The Emergence of Human Rights Responsibilities for Corporations at International Law, 44 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 931, 953 (2004) (delineating the proliferation of corporate codes of conduct). 
2019] PRIVATE LAW REMEDIES 1785 
 
located in the United States, has a CHRP as a foundation for all supplier 
agreements, to which all sellers and their suppliers must adhere, that 
includes standards for leadership and prohibits labor by those under the 
age of sixteen.15  The buyer later discovers that the seller’s supplier, 
located in Pakistan, is employing ball stitchers who are under the age of 
sixteen years old and as young as ten years old.  The buyer faces 
unfavorable news coverage, lost sales of soccer balls and other sporting 
equipment, and damage to its reputation due to the use of child labor 
in its supply chain.16  While the supplier may assert that views are 
different about the age of workers locally and the difficulty finding labor 
near the factory site, the buyer, if the child labor problem remains 
unresolved, may want to cancel the contract and claim damages. 
 
Figure 1:  Relationship of Supply Chain Participants 
 
                                               
 15. See, e.g., Nike’s Commitment to Human Rights & High Labor Compliance Standards, 
NIKE, https://sustainability.nike.com/human-rights (last visited June 1, 2019) (“Nike 
specifically and directly forbids the use of child labor in facilities contracted to make 
Nike products.”); see also Doug Cahn, Human Rights, Soccer Balls, and Better Business 
Practices, CARNEGIE COUNCIL (June 5, 1997), https://www.carnegiecouncil.org/ 
publications/archive/dialogue/1_09/articles/569 (discussing standards Reebok set 
when entering the soccer ball market). 
 16. See generally Dadush, The Law of Identity Harm, supra note 13, at 869–70 
(discussing consumer lawsuits brought against companies purportedly undertaking 
human rights protections and arguing that misleading statements to such effect may 
be the basis for later consumer claims). 
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In examination of this problem, this Article does not question the 
comprehensiveness or content of any individual buyer’s CHRP, since 
remedy clauses in supply contracts arguably operate with corporate 
policies irrespective of the particular content in most cases.17  
Moreover, this Article does not suggest a rewriting of applicable 
Article 2 provisions at a time when such efforts are not likely to be 
availing.18  This Article also does not quibble with those that might 
argue that some remedy might be justified for identity harm to 
consumers when buyers make specific, warranty-like promises that the 
goods sold are CHRP compliant but are not in fact compliant.19  Rather, 
this Article proposes that the implementation of CHRPs are furthered 
by use of a robust set of contract clauses providing access to a permissible 
set of remedies, whether such remedies are default under the UCC or 
CISG or in addition to or substitution for the defaults.  Moreover, the 
Model Contract Clauses (“MCCs”) from the American Bar Association 
(ABA) Working Group to Draft Human Rights Protections in 
International Supply Contracts operate in a permissible manner to 
enforce the deal that the parties made and permit the buyer to recover its 
expectation in the event of breach of an included human rights policy.20 
                                               
 17. David V. Snyder & Susan A. Maslow, Human Rights Protections in International 
Supply Chains—Protecting Workers and Managing Company Risk, 73 BUS. LAW. 1093, 1094 
(2018) [hereinafter Model Contract Clauses] (noting the difference in corporate policies). 
 18. See generally Updates, 88th ALI Annual Meeting, AM. LAW INST., 
http://2011am.ali.org/updates.cfm (last visited June 1, 2019) (discussing the withdrawal 
of the 2003 UCC amendments officially in 2011 due to the fact that no state had enacted 
them in eight years); see also David Frisch, Commercial Law’s Complexity, 18 GEO. MASON L. 
REV. 245, 247 (2011) (providing an example of a failed revision to the UCC); Gregory E. 
Maggs, The Waning Importance of Revisions to U.C.C. Article 2, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 595, 
604 (2003) (explaining that efforts to revise Article 2 have not succeeded throughout 
the years); Fred H. Miller, What Can We Learn from the Failed 2003–2005 Amendments to 
UCC Article 2?, 52 S. TEX. L. REV. 471, 483 (2011) (stating that there have been no state 
enactments of the amended UCC Article 2, and as such, it has been withdrawn as the 
official text); Robert E. Scott, The Rise and Fall of Article 2, 62 LA. L. REV. 1009, 1010 (2002) 
(discussing the end of the “fifteen[-]year effort” to revise Article 2). 
 19. See generally Dadush, The Law of Identity Harm, supra note 13, at 848–55 (arguing in 
favor of reparatory damages where goods are sold with “values-integrity” but are non-
compliant); see generally Sarah Dadush, Contracting for Human Rights:  Looking to Version 2.0 of 
the ABA Model Contract Clauses, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 1519 (2019); see also U.C.C. § 2-708(2) (AM. 
LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2011) (providing for an alternative measure of damages 
where § 2-708(1) is “inadequate to put the seller in as good a position as performance would 
have done”). 
 20. Model Contract Clauses, supra note 17, at 1094 (stating that contractual policies 
for human rights “have great potential to make a difference when combined with 
effective remedies for their violation and a willingness to enforce them”). 
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The goal of this Article is not to convince those who prefer greater 
human rights obligations for commercial buyers that there must be a 
single set of preferred contract clauses or set of remedies in supply 
contracts.  Instead, those advocating for advancement of human rights 
should recognize the complicated nature of human rights and that 
solutions arising from private law initiatives must be both “legally 
effective and operationally likely.”21  Corporate decision-makers, 
though, must recognize that a commitment to human rights and stated 
corporate policies protecting such rights compels the adoption of 
meaningful provisions in supply contracts implementing the policies.  
This implementation would undoubtedly include access to non-penal 
remedies, whether such remedies are default in nature or not. 
This Article attempts to guide those endeavoring to craft permissible 
remedies clauses as part of the implementation of corporate human 
rights policies in supply contracts.  Part I of this Article explores the 
importance of corporate policy statements on human rights and the 
relationship of policy and action in supply contracts.22  Part II begins 
with a discussion of the generally accepted principle of both default 
remedies:  that an aggrieved party can recover a remedy that is 
ordinarily non-punitive and based on and limited to an expectation 
measure of damages.23  While not fully compensating an aggrieved 
party for all losses suffered, expectation damages are considered the 
most appropriate measure of damages in most cases.  Part II then 
demonstrates how default remedies under the UCC and CISG might 
apply to a breach by a supply chain seller of a contractually obligated 
CHRP and the limitations on modifications to these default remedies.  
This Part underscores that contractual damages ordinarily do not 
provide any type of windfall to an aggrieved party or impose a penalty 
on the breaching party in the case of human rights abuses contrary to 
supply contract obligations.  Part III examines the remedy provisions 
contained in the MCCs.24  This Part provides an analysis of the MCCs 
that takes into account, to a greater degree, the broader considerations 
                                               
 21. Id. (noting that corporate policy principles “need to be put into practice” and 
that by placing these terms in contracts, companies can guide the behavior of other 
parties); see also Dadush, The Law of Identity Harm, supra note 13, at 832–33 (recognizing 
the “challenges” to holding accountable those selling goods with accompanying 
“virtuous promises”). 
 22. See infra Part I and accompanying text. 
 23. See infra Part II and accompanying text. 
 24. See infra Part III and accompanying text; see also Model Contract Clauses, supra 
note 17, ¶¶ 5.1–5.5. 
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of remedies theory under the UCC, the CISG, and contract law as a 
whole.  Finally, Part IV of this Article argues that use of the MCCs, which 
provide a wide array of monetary and non-monetary remedies, is 
consistent with general remedial principles and constitutes an 
indispensable part of implementation of corporate policy.25  In doing so, 
Part IV explains the application of the MCCs in the event of breach by the 
seller of the CHRP, such that the buyer recovers its expectation but does 
not profit from human rights abuses and there is no penalty to seller. 
I.    CORPORATE POLICY STATEMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
The ground rules for contractual remedies take into account the 
relative standards to which the UCC and CISG hold “performance 
obligation of . . . sellers,” giving an aggrieved buyer expansive rights to 
remedies that are contingent upon the nature of the transaction at 
issue and can include incidental and consequential damages.26  As 
such, any inquiry into remedies must follow the imposition of a 
particular contractual obligation, here implementation of a CHRP 
(which could be a corporate code of conduct, policy, or other 
principles-related statement) that contains provisions relative to 
human rights, taking into account that the decision to adopt a CHRP 
is a voluntary one.27  The voluntary nature of CHRPs can be contrasted 
with other non-voluntary matters of corporate governance and 
oversight that can in some cases trigger liability of even board members 
for failing to monitor corporate compliance.28  The availability of 
                                               
 25. See infra Part IV and accompanying text. 
 26. See generally Ellen A. Peters, Remedies for Breach of Contracts Relating to the Sale of Goods 
Under the Uniform Commercial Code:  A Roadmap for Article Two, 73 YALE L.J. 199, 201 (1963) 
(“The heart of Article 2 is its treatment of the performance obligation of buyers and 
sellers.”).  See U.C.C. § 2-703 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2011); see also CISG, supra 
note 3, art. 74 (damages “consist of a sum equal to the loss, including loss of profit”). 
 27. Dadush, Identity Harm, supra note 13, at 867 (“[C]orporate and industry 
commitments to sustainability tend only to be voluntary, and so not legally 
enforceable.”); Mark D. Kielsgard, Unocal and the Demise of Corporate Neutrality, 
36 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 185, 185 (2005); see also Lucy Amis, A Guide for Business:  How to 
Develop a Human Rights Policy, OFF. OF THE U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUM. RTS. 6 
(2011), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/DevelopHumanRightsPo 
licy_en.pdf [hereinafter Global Compact Guide for Business] (noting that while human 
rights protection are not a legal treaty duty of business entities, the obligations may 
have legal obligations arising from domestic law). 
 28. See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967–70 (Del. Ch. 
1996) (stating that directors have an obligation to attempt in good faith to have a 
corporate reporting system, and that failure to do so can result in liability for the 
director if the director fails to comply with legal standards); see also Jennifer Arlen, The 
2019] PRIVATE LAW REMEDIES 1789 
 
contractual remedies, though, turns not on whether there is a 
governmentally mandated obligation but, rather, on whether the 
buyer has a corporate policy that includes the protection of human 
rights and that the buyer has taken the steps to contractually 
implement the CHRP into practice through supply chain obligations 
that make the obligations answerable for breach.29 
It is widely believed that corporate policies, independent of any 
contractual obligations with outside parties, form an important part of 
the dialogue between a company and its shareholders and, thereby, 
enhance profitability.30  These public statements reflect some type of 
commitment by the corporation at the highest levels of decision-
making to particular standards, presumably with processes in place to 
carry the policy into action in the day-to-day business operations.31  Yet, 
responding to corporate stakeholders with a CHRP does not 
necessarily entail a commitment to a broad array of human rights 
protections and does not necessarily represent a commitment to 
                                               
Story of Allis-Chalmers, Caremark, and Stone:  The Directors’ Evolving Duty to Monitor, in 
CORPORATE LAW STORIES 323, 325–26 (J. Mark Ramseyer ed., 2009) (exploring 
Caremark’s impact on directors’ oversight duties); Cristie Ford & David Hess, Can 
Corporate Monitorships Improve Corporate Compliance?, 34 J. CORP. L. 679, 690 (2009) 
(discussing corporate compliance obligations and Caremark); Todd Haugh, The 
Criminalization of Compliance, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1215, 1229 (2017) (arguing the 
impact of Caremark on corporate compliance functions). 
 29. See Global Compact Guide for Business, supra note 27, at 4 (“A human rights policy 
can take many forms and has no uniform definition.”); see also Bradford, supra note 14, 
at 158 (asserting that many companies with codes of conduct do not include human 
rights protections and still others do not abide by their human rights commitments). 
 30. See Global Compact Guide for Business, supra note 27, at 12 (urging companies to consult 
with stakeholders to manage expectations around adopting a human rights policy); Ben 
DiPietro, Companies Find Value in Combining Compliance, Sustainability, WALL ST. J. (May 15, 
2018, 10:51 AM), https://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2018/05/15/companies-find-
value-in-combining-compliance-sustainability/#comments_sector (noting that protecting a 
company involves coordination of corporate policies and that the regulator may be private in 
nature); Robust Governing Practices and Shareholder Dialogue Aid Public Company Performance, BUS. 
WIRE (Feb. 25, 2011, 3:09 PM), https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20110225 
005872/en/Robust-Governing-Practices-Shareholder-Dialogue-Aid-Public (discussing the 
Policy Statement on Corporate Government of TIAA-CREF, “one of America’s largest 
institutional investors”). 
 31. See U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), 
United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, princ. 16, at 16, U.N. 
Doc. HR/PUB/11/04 (2011) [hereinafter UNGPs] (policy commitments should be 
approved at the “senior” level of management, be publicly available, and reflected in 
business policies and procedures); Global Compact Guide for Business, supra note 27, at 4 
(positing that a human rights policy can take many forms but is generally a public 
statement adopted by a company to respect human rights standards). 
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enforcing any policy adopted through the supply chain.32  That is, the 
CHRP may only “raise awareness” of human rights practices or 
represent “good business practice,” rather than create defined 
contractual obligations that become part of corporate dealings and 
become enforceable through remedies in the event of breach.33 
The role of CHRPs is reflected in the UN Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights’ (“UNGPs”) direction that business 
enterprises should have publicly available company policy statements 
protecting human rights.34  Efforts toward enhancing business 
responsibility has led to the proliferation of CHRPs,35 industry association 
initiatives,36 and a consensus that “[b]usinesses should support and 
respect the protection of internationally proclaimed human rights.”37  
The efforts of the ABA yielded the ABA Model Business and Supplier 
                                               
 32. See Global Compact Guide for Business, supra note 27, at 7–8 (stating that 
companies may have human rights protections for various reasons). 
 33. See id. at 8 (outlining various reasons why a company may choose to implement 
a human rights policy). 
 34. UNGPs, supra note 31. 
 35. See Bradford, supra note 14, at 156–57; see also Christopher P. Skroupa, Human 
Rights—A Growing Risk for Companies Doing Business in Tough Places, FORBES (June 10, 
2016, 8:54 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/christopherskroupa/2016/06/10/hu
man-rights-a-growing-risk-for-companies-doing-business-in-tough-places (“We are also 
going to see far more human rights-related pressure from courts and investors across 
the world space . . . .  Such legislation will force companies to say something about 
what they are doing for human rights.”). 
 36. See, e.g., About the International Cocoa Initiative, INT’L COCOA INITIATIVE, 
https://cocoainitiative.org/about-ici/about-us (last visited June 1, 2019) (stating that 
the initiative “promotes child protection in cocoa-growing communities”); 
RESPONSIBLE BUS. ALLIANCE, http://www.responsiblebusiness.org (last visited June 1, 
2019) (noting that the organization is “dedicated to corporate social responsibility in 
global supply chains”). 
 37. The Ten Principles of the UN Global Compact, U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT, 
https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/mission/principles (last visited 
June 1, 2019) [hereinafter Principles of the UN Global Compact] (quoting Principle 
1, concerning business support for human rights).  The UN Global Compact is a 
voluntary initiative that has more than 13,000 members, including large 
multinational companies, such as The Coca-Cola Company, Gap Inc., General 
Electric, General Mills, General Motors, and Nike, Inc.  See Our Participants, U.N. 
GLOBAL COMPACT, https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/participants/s 
earch?utf8=%E2%9C%93&search%5Bkeywords%5D=&search%5Bsort_field%5D
=joined_on&search%5Bsort_direction%5D=asc (last visited June 1, 2019) (use 
“Search Participants” field to enter The Coca-Cola Company, Gap Inc., General 
Electric, General Mills, General Motors, and Nike, Inc.). 
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Principles on Labor Trafficking and Child Labor.38  Yet, is the existence 
of CHRPs alone equivalent to positive action protecting human rights, or 
should companies take additional steps toward implementation?39 Should 
implementation include imposing obligations outside its own business 
structure, including in supply chain contracts? 
While many companies have CHRPs, the nature of the policies vary 
to a wide degree with no particular agreement overall as to the breadth 
of the expectations that should form the basis for later contractual 
obligation.40  Some CHRPs are brief and unsophisticated in coverage, 
making it less likely to form the basis of a defined contractual 
obligation with business partners.41  Moreover, the particular rights 
addressed in any particular CHRP are likely to reflect differing 
business lines and priorities such that obligations might not necessarily 
be broadly defined across industries.42  That said, many CHRPs reflect 
a common set of rights and principles,43 such as those set forth in the 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights,44 UNGPs,45 and the ABA 
Model Business and Supplier Policies on Labor Trafficking and Child 
                                               
 38. There are both ABA Model Business and Supplier Principles on Labor 
Trafficking and Child Labor (“ABA Model Principles”) and ABA Model Business and 
Supplier Policies on Labor Trafficking and Child Labor (“Model Policies”).  The ABA 
Model Principles are the high-level articulation of the detailed material in the Model 
Policies.  The ABA Model Principles also form Part II of the Model Policies.  Only the 
ABA Model Principles were adopted by the ABA House of Delegates, so only the ABA 
Model Principles represent the official position of the American Bar Association.  For 
a detailed discussion, see E. Christopher Johnson, Jr., Business Lawyers Are in a Unique 
Position to Help Their Clients Identify Supply-Chain Risks Involving Labor Trafficking and 
Child Labor, 70 BUS. LAW. 1083 (2015); see also ABA Model Business and Supplier Policies 
on Labor Trafficking and Child Labor:  The Working Group, ABA (Jan. 9, 2019), 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/initiatives_awards/child_labor. 
 39. UNGPs, supra note 31, at 1 (citing the “need for rights and obligations to be 
matched to appropriate and effective remedies when breached”). 
 40. See Global Compact Guide for Business, supra note 27, at 4. 
 41. See id. (describing a process that might change policy statements as corporate 
buy-in increases). 
 42. See id. at 12–16. 
 43. See, e.g., UNGPs, supra note 31, princ. 12 (“The responsibility of business 
enterprises to respect human rights refers to internationally recognized human 
rights—understood, at a minimum, as those expressed in the International Bill of 
Human Rights and the principles concerning fundamental rights set out in the 
International Labour Organization’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles and 
Rights at Work.”); ABA MODEL POLICIES, supra note 10. 
 44. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights 71 (Dec. 10, 
1948) (providing “inalienable rights of all members” of society). 
 45. UNGPs, supra note 31, princ. 11 (recognizing the responsibility of business 
entities in promoting human rights). 
1792 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:1781 
 
Labor.46  Typically, the human rights identified in CHRPs include, at a 
minimum, protections against labor trafficking and child labor.47 
Even where a CHRP is in place, not all policies are integrated into 
corporate business relationships such that they might form part of 
contractual obligations created and be the basis for contractual 
remedies.48  Yet, to stand aside in the face of exterior human rights 
abuses without implementing existing policy in business relationships 
can amount to being complicit in the human rights abuses of others.49  
Intervention, though, might necessitate a buyer to compel particular 
supplier behavior where there is indirect control, at most.50  An 
approach whereby well-developed CHRPs are part of the corporate 
standards widely paves the way for integration through supply contracts 
and implications for failure to act in accordance with stated policy.51 
A “remediation policy and plan” that implements a CHRP 
necessarily includes both prohibitions of abuses and mechanisms with 
respect to remediation.52  With respect to supply contracts, this 
inevitably includes protections in supply contracts, presumably 
through incorporation of the CHRP as part of the contractual 
                                               
 46. ABA MODEL POLICIES, supra note 10. 
 47. See, e.g., id. princ. 1; see also UNGPs, supra note 31, princ. 12 (“[S]ome human 
rights may be at greater risk than others in particular industries or contexts . . . .”); 
Global Compact Guide for Business, supra note 27, at 19–21 (identifying human rights 
areas commonly covered to include non-discrimination, equality, child labor, forced 
labor, freedom of association, health and safety, working conditions, wages, 
harassment, people with disabilities, maternity protection, and right to strike). 
 48. See UNGPs, supra note 31, princ. 19, at 20–21 (directing “appropriate action” 
to mitigate human rights abuses, considering the leverage that the business may have 
to address the impact); Global Compact Guide for Business, supra note 27, at 14 (stating 
that a company may choose to have a “stand-alone” statement on human rights without 
incorporating it into the larger corporate policy scheme). 
 49. See UNGPs, supra note 31, princ. 19, at 20–21 (explaining that businesses should 
have policies but also processes for remediation). 
 50. See, e.g., ABA MODEL POLICIES, supra note 10, princ. 4, at 4 (discussing how 
business should have a remediation policy and plan); see also UNGPs, supra note 31, 
princ. 19, at 20–22 (“Leverage is considered to exist where the enterprise has the ability 
to effect change in the wrongful practices of an entity that causes a harm.”). 
 51. See UNGPs, supra note 31, princ. 19, at 21–22 (noting the complexity where the 
impact is linked to the business through a relationship with another entity); Global 
Compact Guide for Business, supra note 27, at 14, 24–25. 
 52. See, e.g., UNGPs, supra note 31, princ. 19, at 20–22 (leverage may include 
terminating business relationships or other means to mitigate adverse harms); ABA 
MODEL POLICIES, supra note 10, princs. 1, 4, at 4; see also Global Compact Guide for 
Business, supra note 27, at 25. 
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representations and warranties and implications for non-adherence.53  
To the extent the CHRP, irrespective of breadth of coverage, is 
included as part of the supply contract obligations as part of the 
implementation of the CHRP, recourse to permissible contractual 
remedies compensates the buyer and becomes a part, though arguably 
not all, of a remediation plan in the event of breach. 
II.    BUYER’S DEFAULT REMEDIES 
In general, the UCC and CISG work alongside the common law of 
contracts unless displaced by its provisions, including principles of law 
and equity.54  It is for this reason that well understood principles of 
remedies, particularly the theories underlying them, would play a role 
in remedies awarded to a non-breaching business enterprise seeking 
to enforce an agreed to CHRP breached by a supplier.55  While an 
aggrieved buyer is entitled to collect its expectation interest related to 
the performance of the CHRP,56  it does not follow that the aggrieved 
buyer has uninhibited reign with respect to imposing liability on the 
breaching seller.57  This premise holds true irrespective of how 
admirable and important it might be to protect vulnerable parties.  
                                               
 53. Global Compact Guide for Business, supra note 27, at 24–25. 
 54. U.C.C. § 1-103(b) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2011) (“Unless 
displaced by the particular provisions of [the Uniform Commercial Code], the 
principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to 
capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, 
coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, and other validating or invalidating cause supplement 
its provisions.”); see also CISG, supra note 3, art. 7(2) (“[M]atters governed by this 
Convention which are not expressly settled in it are to be settled in conformity with 
the general principles on which it is based or, in the absence of such principles, in 
conformity with the law applicable . . . .”); Robyn L. Meadows, Code Arrogance and 
Displacement of Common Law and Equity:  A Defense of Section 1-103 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, 54 SMU L. REV. 535, 537–38 (2001) (“[M]any commercial disputes 
cannot be decided without resort to common law and equity.”). 
 55. See generally MURRAY, supra note 1, § 118[D][6] (discussing that the remedies 
under the UCC are a “combination of traditional contract remedies and the creativity 
of . . . Karl Llewellyn”). 
 56. U.C.C. § 2-703; see CISG, supra note 3, art. 74; see also CISG Advisory Council 
Opinion No. 6, Calculation of Damages Under CISG Article 74, op. 9 (2006), 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/CISG-AC-op6.html (“Damages must not place the 
aggrieved party in a better position than it would have enjoyed if the contract had been 
properly performed.”). 
 57. U.C.C. § 2-703; see also CISG, supra note 3, art. 6 (allowing parties to vary the default 
provisions).  But see CISG Advisory Council Opinion No. 10, Agreed Sums Payable upon Breach 
of an Obligation in CISG Contracts, cmt. 3.3 (2012), http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/CISG-
AC-op10.html (“domestic protection mechanisms” apply “to agreed sums in CISG contracts”). 
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The basic principles that achieve balance in terms of fairness at 
common law, including certainty, foreseeability, and mitigation, apply 
to prevent overcompensation.58 
With that in mind, the provisions for remedies for commercial 
transactions that would be applicable to a hypothetical dispute involving 
a breach of the soccer ball stitching human rights obligations, are 
contained in Part 7 of Article 2 and Articles 45–50 and 74–77 of the 
CISG.59  The primary ground rules for a buyer’s damages depend upon 
whether the parties’ dispute is subject to the default remedial 
provisions or whether the parties have modified, limited, or liquidated 
damages by agreement.60 
In an observation more than fifty years ago, then Professor Ellen 
Peters—later a Connecticut Supreme Court Chief Justice—noted with 
respect to Article 2 of the UCC, the difficulty of imposing greater 
liability on a seller than default rules provide: 
The buyer . . . will find little more that he can do by contract to enhance 
his damages in the event of seller’s nonperformance.  Of course he can 
extract high performance standards, and multiple and diverse express 
warranties.  Beyond that, he may communicate information about 
possible business losses to be expected in the event of default.  And 
possibly he may be able to draft a generously compensatory liquidated 
damages clause.  It is interesting that there is no equivalent on the 
buyer’s side to the seller’s guarantee of minimal recovery from a 
defaulting buyer who has made a down payment.  And none of the 
statutory suggestions of 2-719, except its permission to “alter” the 
measure of damages, are relevant to increase the seller’s liability.61 
                                               
 58. U.C.C. § 1-305.  Comment 1 states: “The second [proposition of § 1-305] is to make 
it clear that compensatory damages are limited to compensation.  They do not include 
consequential or special damages, or penal damages; and the Uniform Commercial Code 
elsewhere makes it clear that damages must be minimized.”  Id. cmt. 1; see also CISG, supra 
note 3, art. 77 (stating that parties must take “reasonable” measures “to mitigate the loss”); 
CISG Advisory Council Opinion No. 6, supra note 56, cmt. 2 (stating that damages do not 
have to be proved with “mathematical precision” and mitigation applies). 
 59. See generally U.C.C. § 2-711 (buyer’s remedies in general); CISG, supra note 3, 
art. 74–77.  With respect to the CISG, many of the remedies are analogous or even 
identical to that of Article 2, primarily focusing on suspending performance, specific 
performance, avoidance of contract, cover damages, expectation damages, including 
consequential damages, price reductions, and damages for partial non-delivery.  As 
such, this Article may not always reference the CISG’s remedial provisions directly 
unless there is a distinction from the UCC or where otherwise helpful. 
 60. See Peters, supra note 26, at 280 (noting the “opportunity” for parties to 
“diverg[e] from statutory calculation of damages”). 
 61. See id. at 283. 
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Bearing in mind the difficulty in broadening the obligations of sellers, 
this section will explore how Article 2 (and to an extent, the CISG) 
might apply to a dispute involving a breach by a supply chain seller of a 
buyer’s corporate policy that commits to protections of human rights. 
A.   Evaluation of Remedies Under Default Rules 
In the event that a buyer implements a CHRP in the supply chain 
but does not include particular provisions relative to remedies akin to 
those set forth in the MCCs, default remedy provisions apply.62  Default 
remedy provisions under Article 2 fall into two categories, which 
depends on whether the buyer has accepted the goods or not,63 while 
the CISG’s provisions generally provide for recovery for “loss.”64  
Article 2’s paths lead to a menu of monetary remedies with respect to 
non-accepted goods (as well as remedies to obtain the goods 
themselves) under section 2-711,65 and monetary remedies with 
respect to accepted goods under section 2-714.66  Moreover, “remedies 
[are] to be liberally administered . . . unless a different effect is 
specifically prescribed.”67  Accordingly, an aggrieved buyer should have 
access to a number of default remedies for loss relative to the goods in 
question in the event that the buyer discovers the breach of the CHRP. 
Often times, though, the remedy for breach of a buyer’s contractually 
obligated CHRP will be in large part based on a claim of consequential 
                                               
 62. U.C.C. § 2-102 (explaining that Article 2 applies to transactions in goods). 
 63. Id. § 2-711 cmt. 1; see also CISG, supra note 3, art. 74 (“Damages for breach of 
contract by one party consist of a sum equal to the loss, including loss of profit, suffered 
by the other party as a consequence of the breach.  Such damages may not exceed the 
loss which the party in breach foresaw or ought to have foreseen at the time of the 
conclusion of the contract, in the light of the facts and matters of which he then knew 
or ought to have known, as a possible consequence of the breach of contract.”); Peters, 
supra note 26, at 254 (explaining that U.C.C. 2-711(1) requires that the buyer make 
out a case for rejection or revocation of acceptance, otherwise U.C.C. 2-714 governs 
and measures damages differently). 
 64. See CISG., supra note 3, art. 74; CISG Advisory Council Opinion No. 6, supra 
note 56, cmts. 2.3, 2.7 (detailing losses recoverable). 
 65. U.C.C. § 2-711 cmt. 1 (explaining that “[t]o index in this section the buyer’s 
remedies,” the provision permits recovery of money and the right to cover). 
 66. Id. § 2-714 (stating that the buyer’s recovery is based upon difference in value 
along with incidental and consequential damages); see also David Frisch, The 
Compensation Myth and U.C.C. Section 2-713, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 173, 179 (2014) 
(describing Article 2 as “exceptional among statutory regimes by not prescribing a 
general standard of recovery for the aggrieved party, but instead employing specific 
formulas for computing damages”). 
 67. U.C.C. § 2-711 cmt. 3. 
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damages.68  For instance, consequential damages would include those 
arising from lost business and reputation if it were discovered, in our 
earlier hypothetical, that children stitched the company’s soccer balls, 
particularly if the use of child labor was pervasive.  While the 
commentary makes clear that the buyer does not have to prove these 
reputational and related consequential damages with “certainty” or 
“mathematical precision,” the buyer retains the proof of loss, making 
recovery for reputational damages challenging.69  Further complicating 
recovery of consequential damages in the event of breach of a CHRP is 
that there is an expectation of some aspect of mitigation by specifying 
that buyers may only collect consequential damages, “which could not 
reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise.”70 
How to prove and mitigate reputational and lost sales damages due 
to breach of a contractually operative CHRP may be a formidable task 
in a market of “conscious consumerism” where “consumers are 
increasingly willing to pay a premium for goods sold by companies 
whose . . . values align with their own.”71  The implication is that the 
buyer who is deemed less-virtuous will have a worse reputation and be 
relegated to a lower market price, as well as potentially being exposed 
to consumer lawsuits.72  Yet, proving a supply chain buyer’s 
consequential damage from breach of a CHRP by a supplier in any 
“reasonable” measure will surely be daunting.73  Moreover, discovery 
that children stitched the soccer balls raises considerations of what type 
of mitigation is required to preserve a supply chain buyer’s ability to 
claim consequential damages.  Prevention of consequential damages by 
                                               
 68. Id. § 2-715(2); CISG Advisory Council Opinion No. 6, supra note 56, op. 3 
(explaining that lost profits and other losses are recoverable). 
 69. U.C.C. § 2-715 cmt. 4; CISG Advisory Council Opinion No. 6, supra note 56, op. 3. 
 70. U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a); see id. cmt. 2 (explaining that “the older rule at common 
law which made the seller liable for all consequential damages of which he had ‘reason 
to know’ in advance is followed, the liberality of that rule is modified by refusing to 
permit recovery unless the buyer could not reasonably have prevented the loss by cover 
or otherwise”).  Like Article 2, the CISG also contains a requirement to mitigate 
damages in Article 74.  See CISG Advisory Council Opinion No. 6, supra note 56, op. 4 
(stating that the costs of mitigation are recoverable). 
 71. Dadush, Identity Harm, supra note 13, at 869–70. 
 72. See id. (“A year-over-year analysis found that sales of goods marketed as 
promoting socially conscious business practices outpaced sales of brands without such 
claims by a factor of five.”). 
 73. U.C.C. § 2-715 cmt. 4. 
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“cover or otherwise”74 could simply require the buyer to procure 
replacement soccer balls but could also theoretically lead to 
expectations that mitigation might include some form of reparations for 
the harm to the employees, the child stitchers.75 
While the default rules of Article 2 and the CISG include the right 
of an aggrieved buyer to “cancel” or “avoid” the contract,76  cancellation 
is not available for all breaches.  In particular, cancellation is limited if 
the supply contract is an installment contract.77  Often times, the supply 
contract at issue is one with delivery of goods in lots,78 making it an 
installment contract.  If so, access to a cancellation remedy in the event 
of a breach of a CHRP would turn not on the likelihood of future human 
rights abuses, but on the significance of the breach.79 
So, a buyer may face the prospect of desiring cancellation for some 
conduct prohibited by the supply contract, yet not have clear direction 
about when it may justifiably cancel under the default provisions.80  
Some breaches of a CHRP might fall within this standard of “substantial 
impairment”81 of the whole contract or “fundamental breach”82 where 
                                               
 74. Id. § 2-715(2)(a); see also § 2-712(1) (“After a breach . . . the buyer may ‘cover’ 
by making in good faith and without unreasonable delay any reasonable purchase of 
or contract to purchase goods in substitution for those due from the seller.”). 
 75. See Dadush, Identity Harm, supra note 13, at 864–68, 933 (arguing that remedies 
for violations of a corporation’s promise to sustainably source goods are currently 
limited, but should include injunctive relief, replacement of goods, and fulfillment of 
a corporation’s promise to consumers). 
 76. U.C.C. § 2-711; see also CISG, supra note 3, art. 49 (finding avoidance where 
there is a “fundamental breach” of the contract). 
 77. See U.C.C. § 2-612 (defining “installment contract” as “one which requires or 
authorizes the delivery of goods in separate lots”); see also Peters, supra note 26, at 223 
(explaining that the right to cancel is modified when there is an installment contract).  
Moreover, section 2-612 arguably limits the perfect tender rule of section 2-601 with respect 
to installment contracts, thereby limiting the buyer’s right to even reject goods.  Id. at 224–25. 
 78. See U.C.C. § 2-105(5) (defining lot to mean “a parcel . . . which is the subject matter 
of a separate sale or delivery, whether or not it is sufficient to perform the contract”). 
 79. See id. § 2-612(3) (stating that in the event the buyer accepts a non-conforming 
shipment without calling for cancellation, the buyer reinstates the contract); see also 
CISG, supra note 3, art. 73(2) (“If one party’s failure to perform any of his obligations 
in respect of any instalment gives the other party good grounds to conclude that a 
fundamental breach of contract will occur with respect to future instalments, he may 
declare the contract avoided for the future, provided that he does so within a 
reasonable time.”). 
 80. See Peters, supra note 26, at 225 (noting “[t]he section is reasonably clear at the 
extremes,” such as when the breach is “trivial and curable”). 
 81. See U.C.C. § 2-612(3). 
 82. See CISG, supra note 3, art. 73(1).  
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the human rights abuses by the supply chain seller constituting the 
breach are of a particularly serious nature and remain uncured, perhaps 
due to a pervasive and uncured stitching of soccer balls by twelve-year-
old children.83  The buyer may face difficulty determining if cancellation 
is permitted due to the absence of a readily available right to 
cancellation the nature of the non-compliance by the supplier.84  The 
buyer may still be able to cancel an installment contract if the breach 
arises, for instance, from the twelve-year-old ball stitcher where the 
parties discover the problem and the supplier cures by removing the 
worker from the supply chain, but this is not clear.85  Even where the 
buyer believes it is justified in calling for cancellation, the seller may well 
challenge the cancellation as not resulting in the requisite impairment 
of the contract as a whole, even where human rights abuses persist.86 
In sum, if a buyer has implemented its CHRP contractually through 
its supply chain, the default remedies provide a range of remedies that 
are primarily market-based in nature.  Unfortunately, the market-
based remedy will likely only solve part of the buyer’s damages, leaving 
access to consequential damages necessary to fulfill an aggrieved 
buyer’s expectation.  The proof and mitigation requirements for these 
damages, though, may prove troublesome for buyers even if the 
supplier seller can pay them, which is not necessarily the case.  
Moreover, while cancellation is available under the UCC and CISG the 
remedy is not readily available as a default remedy if the contract is an 
installment contract.  With this background on the limitations of 
default remedies, the next section will explore the extent to which the 
parties can contractually modify damages to address these challenges. 
                                               
 83. A buyer would be able to reject the goods and cancel the contract where there 
are “incurable substantial defects or for substantial defects in which the seller does not 
promptly promise to cure.”  Peters, supra note 26, at 226–27. 
 84. See id. at 226 (describing various circumstances where it is unclear if the buyer may 
cancel, such as when “the defect is trivial and uncurable” or “trivial, curable, but not cured”). 
 85. See id. at 227 (noting that cancellation in this type of substantial defect that is 
uncured is “unclear,” but suggesting that cure should not be permitted for substantial 
defects that impair the whole contract due to the “omission” of cure from subsection (3)). 
 86. See U.C.C. § 2-612 cmt. 6 (noting the buyer’s entitlement to cancellation turns 
“not on whether such non-conformity indicates an intent or likelihood that the future 
deliveries will also be defective, but whether the non-conformity substantially impairs 
the value of the whole contract”); see also Peters, supra note 26, at 227 (noting the lack 
of “sufficient certainty” as to some of the applications of cancellation in section 2-612). 
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B.   Modifications of Buyer Remedies 
In light of the challenges to asserting the default remedies facing the 
hypothetical buyer of soccer balls from a supplier that used child labor for 
stitching, the buyer should consider a robust set of alternative remedies 
prescribed in the supply contract.  The MCCs seek to provide such a slate of 
remedies in addition to and in substitution of Article 2 and CISG remedies, 
whichever may be applicable, drafted in a buyer-friendly manner.87 
Importantly, parties retain broad discretion to shape their remedies, as 
both Article 2 and the CISG permit parties to vary from the default 
remedies.88  This would include both modifying or limiting remedies as 
well as agreements liquidating remedies.89  Yet, the overall remedial policy 
remains one toward compensating aggrieved parties only to the extent of 
full recovery reflecting full performance of the transaction.90  Importantly, 
agreed remedies that might be viewed as a penalty are routinely rejected 
as void.91  Thus, the operative provisions appear to favor a buyer recovery 
aimed toward a limited recovery by buyers of the loss actually suffered as 
reflected by a measure approximating full contractual performance. 
With this in mind, the buyer, knowing the difficulties it might face in 
the event of a breach of a CHRP implemented in the supply chain, might 
                                               
 87. See Model Contract Clauses, supra note 17, ¶¶ 5.1–5.5 (permitting the buyer to 
suspend payments to supplier, get damages, and return, destroy, or donate a Seller’s goods, 
among other remedial measures); see also infra Part III (describing the remedies under the 
ABA MCCs and the difficulty for an aggrieved buyer to access all available damages). 
 88. See U.C.C. § 2-719 cmt. 1 (asserting that parties are “free to shape their 
remedies to their particular requirements”); CISG, supra note 3, art. 6 (permitting 
parties to derogate from any of the Convention’s provisions); see also CISG Advisory 
Council Opinion No. 10, supra note 57, op. 2 (“[T]he parties may derogate from 
[CISG] Articles 74–79 . . . .”). 
 89. See U.C.C. § 2-718 cmt. 1 (permitting liquidated damage clauses where “the 
amount involved is reasonable in the light of the circumstances of the case”); see also 
CISG Advisory Council Opinion No. 6, supra note 56, cmt. 1.3 (permitting parties to 
“include a liquidated damages provision, which provides for a specified amount of 
damages to be paid by a party who repudiates the agreement”). 
 90. See U.C.C. § 1-305 cmt. 1 (specifying that this provision is intended to “make it 
clear that compensatory damages are limited to compensation”); see CISG., supra note 
3, art. 74 (providing damages to the aggrieved party for the “sum equal to the loss”); 
see also CISG Advisory Council Opinion No. 6, supra note 56, op. 9 (“Damages must 
not place the aggrieved party in a better position than it would have enjoyed if the 
contract had been properly performed.”). 
 91. See U.C.C. § 1-305(a) (prohibiting consequential, special, and penal damages 
“except as specifically provided” in the UCC or “other rule of law”); see also CISG 
Advisory Council Opinion No. 10, supra note 57, cmt. 4.2.2. (assessing the prohibition 
on penalties in light of “what is reasonable in international trade”). 
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contract for a modification of remedies, such as those in the MCCs, but 
likely lacks significant tools to “enhance his damages in the event of 
seller’s nonperformance” and is not “guarantee[d] [any] minimal 
recovery.”92  These impediments to modifying default remedies would still 
apply irrespective of the importance of the CHRP to the buyer, who might 
have a zero-tolerance position as to the CHRP.  As Professor Peters noted, 
however, despite these parameters, the buyer might still use alternative 
remedy provisions that “communicate information about possible 
business losses to be expected in the event of”93 breach of a CHRP. 
In addition to the flexibility to modify the default remedies, contracting 
parties have flexibility to liquidate damages by a sum certain or formula.94  
While the UCC’s abhorrence of penalties is clear,95 the CISG does not 
outright prohibit liquidated damages clauses that are penal in nature, 
leaving “reasonableness” of such clauses to what is “reasonable in 
international trade.”96  Any approach to crafting liquidated remedies for 
breach of a CHRP, though, must not fail to take into account these 
potential limitations on liquidated damages, irrespective of whether the 
contract involves matters of societal importance, such as human rights.  
While a large liquidated damages clause would surely deter breaches of a 
CHRP, it is hard to advocate for such an interpretation that would likely 
face challenge under either Article 2 or the CISG.97 
The next Part of this Article will explore how the remedies provisions 
of the MCCs address the issues raised under the default remedies of 
the UCC and CISG.  It proceeds by identifying the key areas covered 
in the MCCs and then providing an assessment of whether the 
provisions operate in a permissible manner in shaping party 
expectations regarding available remedies in the event of a breach.  
                                               
 92. Peters, supra note 26, at 283. 
 93. Id. 
 94. See U.C.C. § 2-718(1) (“Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the 
agreement” for a reasonable amount); see also CISG, supra note 3, art. 6 (permitting parties to 
derogate from any of the provisions of the Convention); CISG Advisory Council Opinion No. 
10, supra note 57, cmt. 2 (“[T]he parties may derogate from Articles 74–79 . . . .”). 
 95. See U.C.C. § 1-305(a) (emphasizing that penal damages cannot be awarded); see id. § 2-
718(1) (stating that liquidated damages that are unreasonably large are “void as a penalty”). 
 96. CISG Advisory Council Opinion No. 10, supra note 57, cmt. 4.2.2. 
 97. See supra notes 88–96 and accompanying text. 
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III.    THE MCCS PROVIDE A FRAMEWORK OF PERMISSIBLE REMEDIES 
Framed by the accepted attributes of the expectation interest, commercial 
default remedies attempt not to undercompensate or overcompensate an 
aggrieved buyer.  In fact, the default remedies provide a market-based 
recovery to an aggrieved buyer that attempts to protect an expectation 
measure.  Yet, the default remedies present challenges with respect to the 
extent to which an aggrieved buyer facing a supplier in breach of a CHRP 
can successfully access the full range of allowable general and consequential 
damages, particularly with respect to foreseeability, mitigation, and proof 
issues.98  As discussed above, an aggrieved buyer is entitled to be placed in the 
position of full contractual performance without augmentation to the buyer 
or, arguably, penalty to the breaching seller.  There is little leeway toward 
contracting to put the buyer in a better position than full contractual 
performance, or to impose a penalty on the seller.99 
Thus, where the parties agree to alter the default remedies, any such 
modification is still subject to this “expectation cap” for violation of a CHRP 
by those in the supply chain.  The aim of the MCCs, then, cannot be to 
“enhance” the buyer’s damages, but rather to “communicate information 
about possible business losses” and provide the buyer with monetary and 
non-monetary tools toward mitigation and recovery.100  This section will 
examine the MCCs on remedies and evaluate the treatment of the 
particular problems arising from breaches of CHRPs in the supply chain. 
A.   Non-compensatory Remedies are Consistent with  
Principles of Law and Equity 
The MCCs101 generally provide that all remedies are “cumulative” and 
“without prejudice to, any other remedies provided at law or in equity.”102  
                                               
 98. See supra notes 68–86 and accompanying text. 
 99. See supra notes 90–91 and accompanying text. 
 100. Peters, supra note 26, at 283. 
 101. The drafters of the MCCs acknowledged that the particular human rights 
obligations addressed by any particular CHRP may differ, providing for the inclusion 
of the CHRP as “Schedule P.”  See Model Contract Clauses, supra note 17, at 1096 n.13 
(“The letter ‘P’ was chosen [for] the schedule” to correspond with “‘Principles’ or 
‘Policies.’”).  Accordingly, the provisions on remedies at times reference the Schedule 
P.  It is also notable that the ABA MCCs are “buyer-friendly” provisions and in some 
cases “could be perceived by some suppliers as unduly aggressive,” such that 
adjustment or elimination may be warranted in negotiations.  Id. at 1096–97. 
 102. Id. ¶ 5.3. 
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The MCCs103 provide for a number of non-compensatory remedies in 
equity upon breach of a CHRP, including:  (1) validating demands for 
adequate assurances;104 (2) obtaining injunctive relief;105 (3) requiring the 
seller to remove employees;106 (4) requiring the seller to terminate 
subcontracts;107 and (5) suspending payments during investigation108 
until remediation of the violation of the CHRP.  Notably, the MCCs make 
clear that a buyer may decline to avail itself of all remedies, which is 
particularly critical while the parties are working collectively to remedy 
CHRP violations, but such action is not a waiver of its rights.109  Similarly, 
the buyer has a flexible right to cancel part or all of the agreement.110 
These alterations to the default remedies do not deviate in any 
meaningful way from the type of damages expressly provided for or 
seemingly allowable as the “parties are left free to shape their remedies 
to their particular requirements.”111  It is worth noting that some of the 
MCC remedial provisions help a buyer to use its leverage to remediate 
human rights abuses in the supply chain, as well as to “communicate 
information about possible business losses.”112 
                                               
 103. The ABA MCCs “reflect” the remedies applicable to trafficking in persons by 
entities contracting with the U.S. government where the contract has an estimated 
value exceeding $500,000.  FAR § 52.222–50(h)(1)(ii) (2018); Model Contract Clauses, 
supra note 17, ¶ 5.3, at 1103 n.39. 
 104. Model Contract Clauses, supra note 17, ¶ 5.3(a). 
 105. See id. ¶ 5.3(b) (providing that noncompliance with the CHRP “causes Buyer 
great and irreparable harm for which Buyer has no adequate remedy at law and that 
the public interest would be served by injunctive and other equitable relief”). 
 106. Id. ¶ 5.3(c) (extending the provision to “employee[s]” and “Representative[s]” 
of the seller). 
 107. Id. ¶ 5.3(d). 
 108. Id. ¶¶ 5.2, 5.3(e).  Inclusion of clause 5.2 in a supply contract may be advisable 
generally, but the contract should have specific application when payment is to be 
made by letter of credit.  Id. ¶ 5.2. 
 109. See id. ¶ 5.3 (“Buyer’s exercise of remedies and the timing thereof shall not be 
construed in any circumstance as constituting a waiver of its rights under this Agreement.”). 
 110. Id. ¶ 5.3. 
 111. U.C.C. § 2-719 cmt. 1 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2011); see also CISG, 
supra note 3, art. 6 (providing wide discretion to vary default rules); CISG Advisory 
Council Opinion No. 10, supra note 57, cmt. 2 (relying on the freedom of contract to 
permit parties to derogate from the rules). 
 112. Peters, supra note 26, at 283; see U.C.C. § 2-612(2) (permitting the buyer to 
reject “any installment which is non-conforming” if it “substantially impairs the value 
of that installment and cannot be cured”; see also CISG, supra note 3, art. 73(1) 
(permitting a party to declare a contract avoided “if the failure of one party to perform 
any of his obligations . . . constitutes a fundamental breach of contract”). 
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1. Buyers should have recourse to cancellation 
The right to cancellation is a typical remedy generally provided to 
both buyers and sellers alike under applicable default rules.113  
Specifically, permitting a buyer the right of cancellation for breach of 
a CHRP may be, in some cases, an alteration of the default remedies 
due to the “restrictive treatment” for cancellation of installment 
contracts.114  Yet, the MCCs inclusion of an express termination 
clause115 does not provide access to a remedy that is not otherwise 
permitted generally or for installment contracts specifically. 
Inclusion of a cancellation clause of the type employed in the 
MCCs116 will permit a buyer to circumvent the “ambiguity” of whether 
a breach of a CHRP in an ongoing supply contract permits recourse to 
cancellation under the “substantial impairment” and “fundamental 
breach” standards.117  While cancellation of a supply contract may not 
be the preferred choice of a buyer in need of the goods, recourse to 
cancellation is justified.  The UNGPs make clear that “appropriate 
action” in response to a human rights impact may include termination 
but that “ending the relationship” is not always the best response.118  
Because the question of cancellation of installment contracts does not 
turn on the likelihood of future breaches of the CHRP or the impact of 
collaboration with the supplier, buyers will want to have access to a clear 
right to termination if other remediation measures prove unsuccessful. 
The MCCs provide access to additional meaningful equitable 
measures short of cancellation that include providing the buyer with 
the authority to require the seller remove employees119 or terminate 
                                               
 113. U.C.C. §§ 2-703(f), 2-711(1). 
 114. Peters, supra note 26, at 224; see supra notes 76–86 and accompanying text 
(discussing the buyer’s lack of direction on how to cancel an installment contract in 
the event of a breach). 
 115. Model Contract Clauses, supra note 17, ¶ 5.3. 
 116. Id. 
 117. See CISG, supra note 3, art. 73 (noting a party may declare a contract avoided 
if a fundamental breach occurs); Peters, supra note 26, at 225 (noting section 2-612 is 
“reasonably clear at the extremes”); see also supra notes 76–86 and accompanying text. 
 118. UNGPs, supra note 31, princ. 19 & cmt., at 20–22.  The commentary explains: 
“There are situations in which the enterprise lacks the leverage to prevent or mitigate 
adverse impacts and is unable to increase its leverage.  Here, the enterprise should 
consider ending the relationship, taking into account credible assessments of potential 
adverse human rights impacts of doing so.”  Id. 
 119. See Model Contract Clauses, supra note 17, ¶ 5.3(c) (extending the provision to 
“employees” and “representatives” of the seller). 
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subcontracts.120  Exercise of such “leverage” in the business 
relationship with respect to employees and subcontracts may permit 
the parties to continue the contractual relationship in the face of 
CHRP violations by removing employees or subcontractors that are at 
the root cause of the abuses.121  Moreover, these clauses may permit 
businesses to “prevent and mitigate” human rights impacts arising from 
breach of the CHRP at an early point in the relationship, particularly 
where waiting may make the human rights impacts irremediable.122  
Recognizing that cancellation of the supply contract in the event of a 
breach of a CHRP may have other business and human rights impacts,123 
a buyer’s contractual access to cancellation of a subcontract or removal 
of employees and subcontractors as provided in the MCCs becomes 
especially important tools to “cease or prevent the impact.”124 
2. Working with a breaching supplier should not constitute a waiver of the 
buyer’s rights 
Installment contracts also raise issues concerning waiver when parties 
continue performance of the installment contract in the presence of a 
breach of the CHRP, rather than, for instance, cancelling when permitted.125  
A supplier’s continued breach of CHRP obligations would not be “washed 
out” due to the buyer’s earlier acceptance of goods, so that the breaches can 
be cumulative in nature as to the whole supply contract.126  That said, a buyer 
may be found to “reinstate” the supply contract by accepting non-
conforming shipments without notification of cancellation,127 perhaps due 
to attempts to work with the supplier to remedy the human rights impact, 
particularly where the relationship is “‘crucial’ to the enterprise.”128  
                                               
 120. Id. ¶ 5.3(d). 
 121. See UNGPs, supra note 31, princ. 19 & cmt., at 20–21 (“Leverage is considered 
to exist where the enterprise has the ability to effect change in the wrongful practices 
of an entity that causes a harm.”). 
 122. See id. princ. 24 & cmt., at 26 (“[B]usiness enterprises should begin with those 
human rights impacts that would be most severe, recognizing that a delayed response 
may affect remediability.”). 
 123. Id. princ. 19 & cmt., at 20–22. 
 124. Id. princ. 19 & cmt., at 20–21; see id. princ. 24, at 26 (advising businesses to 
prioritize action when human rights impacts are most severe). 
 125. See U.C.C. § 2-612(3) cmt. 6 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2011) 
(“Subsection (3) is designed to further the continuance of the contract in the absence 
of an overt cancellation.”). 
 126. Id.; see CISG, supra note 3, art. 73(2) (“[A] fundamental breach of contract 
[can] occur with respect to future instalments.”). 
 127. U.C.C. § 2-612(3). 
 128. UNGPs, supra note 31, princ. 19 & cmt., at 20–22.  The commentary explains: 
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The UNGPs make clear that “appropriate action” in response to a 
human rights impact depends not only on the “leverage” the buyer may have 
but also upon the complexity and severity of the human rights abuse.129  
Recognizing that the buyer will often work with the supplier that has 
breached the CHRP obligations, the MCCs seek to confirm that the 
“[b]uyer’s exercise of remedies and the timing thereof” should not be 
considered a waiver of remedies available for breach of a CHRP.130  
Accordingly, the possibility that a buyer may work with a supplier who has 
breached a CHRP obligation should not work to the detriment of the buyer. 
3. The buyer should have broad rights to withhold payments 
The right to withhold payments under the MCCs131 is an expressly 
permitted form of default remedy.132  Yet, again, the default right to 
withhold payment is not without limitations. There is no general right 
to a “set-off” and, instead, withholding is limited typically to damages 
under the “same contract.”133  Challenges to withholding payments 
                                               
Where the relationship is ‘crucial’ to the enterprise, ending it raises further 
challenges.  A relationship could be deemed as crucial if it provides a product 
or service that is essential to the enterprise’s business, and for which no 
reasonable alternative source exists.  Here the severity of the adverse human 
rights impact must also be considered:  the more severe the abuse, the more 
quickly the enterprise will need to see change before it takes a decision on 
whether it should end the relationship. 
Id. 
 129. Id.  The commentary details that 
[a]mong the factors that will enter into the determination of the appropriate 
action in such situations are the enterprise’s leverage over the entity 
concerned, how crucial the relationship is to the enterprise, the severity of the 
abuse, and whether terminating the relationship with the entity itself would 
have adverse human rights consequences. 
Id. 
 130. Model Contract Clauses, supra note 17, ¶ 5.3. 
 131. Id. ¶¶ 5.2, 5.3(e). 
 132. See U.C.C. § 2-717 (specifying that upon notification to the seller, the buyer 
can “deduct all or any part of the damages resulting from any breach of the contract 
from any part of the price still due on the same contract”); id. § 2-609(1) (permitting 
a party to “suspend any performance” while waiting for adequate assurances); id. § 2-
711(1) (allowing buyers to recover amounts paid); see also CISG, supra note 3, art. 50 
(permitting the “buyer [to] reduce the price”). 
 133. U.C.C. § 2-717 cmt. 1; see CISG, supra note 3, art. 50 (“[I]f the seller remedies any 
failure to perform his obligations . . . or if the buyer refuses to accept performance by 
the seller . . . , the buyer may not reduce the price.”).  A number of cases explore these 
principles.  See, e.g., Reser’s Fine Foods, Inc. v. H.C. Schmieding Produce Co., LLC, No. 
16-4150-SAC, 2017 WL 4099480, at *6 (D. Kan. Sept. 15, 2017) (“[C]ourts reject setoff 
defenses based on damages arising from breaches of different contracts.”); ITV Direct, 
1806 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:1781 
 
with respect to a breach of a CHRP can be further complicated if the 
contractual agreement of the parties is “considered separate contracts 
under the law,” such as where the parties have a supply agreement with 
general terms but use purchase orders with specific terms or differing 
goods.134  Moreover, a buyer that attempts to work with the seller to 
“mitigate the impact” of the human rights abuses may desire to 
withhold payments during investigations in light of the potential 
“consequences[—]reputational, financial[,] or legal[—]of the 
continuing connection.”135  Accordingly, specifying the right to 
withhold can operate as leverage to obtain remediation of the CHRP 
violation, as well as provide a monetary remedy. 
MCCs provide that a buyer can suspend payments even during 
investigations and on all contracts, not only the contract under which 
the seller supplied the non-conforming goods.136  Including a broadly 
defined equitable right to withhold payments of the type included in 
the MCCs addresses both the issue of whether the amounts 
outstanding to the supplier arise under the same contract in the supply 
chain and whether the buyer may exercise such a general right to offset 
at the earliest point of trouble involving CHRP obligations.137 
4. Buyers should have access to injunctive relief 
While the UCC and CISG do not specifically address the extent of 
access to injunctions and other equitable remedies, these remedies are 
well established at common law.138  With respect to injunctions, the 
MCC appears to reinforce the existing right to seek an injunction.139  
The MCC, though, also communicates that the breach of CHRP 
                                               
Inc. v. Healthy Sols., LLC, 379 F. Supp. 2d 130, 133 (D. Mass. 2005), aff’d, 445 F.3d 66 
(1st Cir. 2006) (quoting C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Med. Elecs. Corp., 529 F. Supp. 1382, 1387 (D. 
Mass. 1982)) (asserting section 2-717 “‘is not a general set-off provision permitting a 
buyer of goods to adjust its continuing contract obligations according to the equities 
perceived by the buyer.’”). 
 134. J-B Mktg., Inc. v. Golden Cty. Foods, Inc., No. 12-cv-106-bbc, 2013 WL 
12109102, at *4 (W.D. Wis. Jan. 31, 2013). 
 135. UNGPs, supra note 31, princ. 19 & cmt., at 22. 
 136. Model Contract Clauses, supra note 17, ¶ 5.2. 
 137. See U.C.C. § 1-103(b) (providing remedies in “law and equity”); see also § 1-
305(a) (“[R]emedies . . . must be liberally administered . . . .”); § 2-711 cmt. 3 (same). 
 138. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 357(2)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) 
(asserting that judicial remedies include injunctions where “the duty is one of 
forbearance”); see also UNGPs, supra note 31, princ. 25 & cmt., at 27 (arguing that 
remedies available to address business related human rights abuses should include “the 
prevention of harm through, for example, injunctions or guarantees of non-repetition”). 
 139. Model Contract Clauses, supra note 17, ¶ 5.3(b). 
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obligations constitute “great and irreparable harm for which [the 
b]uyer has no adequate remedy at law and that the public interest 
would be served by injunctive and other equitable relief.”140  This might 
be key if non-compliant goods are at risk of being sold, resulting in 
increased damages.  Including a specific acknowledgement of access 
to and availability of injunctive relief also aids the buyer in 
communicating to the supplier the importance of “grievance 
mechanisms . . . tak[ing] a range of substantive forms . . . [to] make 
good any human rights harms that have occurred.”141 
B.   Damages Provisions are Consistent with the Principles of Compensation 
Professor Peters remarked that buyers cannot “enhance . . . damages 
in the event of seller[] nonperformance.”142  This observation is 
consistent with the principles of compensation favoring restoration of 
parties to their expectancy, the corresponding prohibitions on 
penalties and the admonition that parties should mitigate their 
damages.143  As such, it is not surprising that the MCC provisions on 
monetary remedies simply state that the buyer is entitled to “damages” 
in the event of a breach of a CHRP.144  Likewise, the MCCs further 
direct that the buyer can recover “all general and consequential 
damages.”145  This too, however, merely reflects the monetary remedies 
approach in existing default remedy provisions.146  Other provisions 
also reflect the principles of the default remedies,147 specifically 
explaining that losses might result from “procurement of replacement 
[g]oods,” “non-delivery of [g]oods,” “diminished sales” of goods under 
the supply contract, other goods sold by the buyer, and damage to the 
buyer’s reputation.148  Beyond communicating the foreseeability of 
reputational damages arising from breach of CHRP obligations, the 
MCCs add little to the collection of damages, in light of the general 
                                               
 140. Id. 
 141. UNGPs, supra note 31, princ. 25 & cmt., at 27. 
 142. See Peters, supra note 26, at 283; see supra notes 92–100 and accompanying text. 
 143. U.C.C. § 1-305 cmt. 1 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2011). 
 144. Model Contract Clauses, supra note 17, ¶ 5.4. 
 145. See supra notes 54–92 and accompanying text. 
 146. See supra notes 54–92 and accompanying text. 
 147. U.C.C. § 2-711 (index of remedies); § 2-712 (cover damages); § 2-713 (damages 
for non-delivery); § 2-714 (damages from accepted goods); § 2-715 (incidental and 
consequential damages); see also CISG, supra note 3, art. 74–76 (covering all losses, 
including cover and market based damages); supra Part II. 
 148. Model Contract Clauses, supra note 17, ¶ 5.4. 
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notions adverse to penalties.149  Quite simply, the MCCs cannot 
meaningfully ease the challenges of proving damages arising from a 
breach of CHRP obligations, particularly consequential damages to the 
reputation of the buyer. 
The MCC on liquidated damages,150 however, requires more 
consideration.  The inclusion of specific contract language regarding 
liquidated damages can take the place of a buyer’s claim for 
reputational and other consequential damages arising from breach of 
a CHRP.151  It is well understood that business relationships that 
negatively impact human rights carry the potential consequences of 
reputational harm and lost sales across the business.152  Any attempt to 
liquidate reputational damages arising from such reputational harm, 
though, is subject to parameters of “reasonableness” and that the 
amount “liquidated” is not so large as to be considered a penalty.153  
While liquidating consequential damages, such as those from lost sales, 
has advantages over proving them at trial, the problem of reputational 
harm to buyers from negative human rights impacts is serious in a 
market of “conscious consumerism” where the impact on the buyer’s 
business prospect can be extreme.154  Yet, what is the optimal way to 
articulate this type of harm? 
The MCCs leave open the amount of, and method for calculation of, 
liquidated damages arising from breach of a CHRP.155  Liquidating 
damages, to reflect a breach of a CHRP that results in impacts on a 
third party’s human rights, is challenging:  the non-breaching party 
suffers reputational damages arising from both the impact on human 
rights of third parties, typically a supplier’s employees who are outside 
of the direct contractual chain, and the “emotional harm” suffered by 
conscious consumers who learn of the impacts on the human rights of 
the third parties.156  The MCC on liquidated damages recognizes the 
possibility that the parties can agree to liquidated damages provision, 
                                               
 149. See supra notes 142–48 and accompanying text. 
 150. Model Contract Clauses, supra note 17, ¶ 5.4. 
 151. See supra notes 68–75 and accompanying text. 
 152. UNGPs, supra note 31, princ. 19 & cmt., at 21–22. 
 153. See supra notes 88–97 and accompanying text. 
 154. See Dadush, Identity Harm, supra note 13, at 869–81 (explaining the 
phenomenon of customers paying more for good with values-oriented practices). 
 155. Model Contract Clauses, supra note 17, ¶ 5.4, at 1103 n.40 (advising “[p]articular 
care” in designating liquidated damages due to the limits on enforceability). 
 156. See Ben-Shahar & Porat, supra note 13, at 1946, 1950–51 (explaining that the 
restoration principle can benefit third parties). 
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which provides that at least part of the recovery takes the form of 
“restoration damages.”157  The parties could set forth a measure of 
recovery that, at least partially, benefits the third parties affected who 
would otherwise be uncompensated if recovery is paid in full to the 
buyer.158  That is, the remedy for reputational harm can take a form 
that remediates the root-cause of the harm to the buyer’s reputation:  
adverse human rights impacts to third parties.159 
Professors Omri Ben-Shahar and Ariel Porat propose a restoration 
remedy in their work.  Their underlying principles can apply to a 
liquidated damages clause designed to compensate for breach of a 
CHRP whereby: 
the wrongdoer is not required to compensate the emotionally 
aggrieved parties directly or undo the emotional harm.  Instead, the 
wrongdoer has to restore the underlying interest that was impaired and 
gave rise to the emotional harm.  The underlying interest is the 
aggrieved party’s plan, agenda, values, or set of preferences that the 
wrongdoer was obligated to promote or protect.160 
The restoration remedy identifies the “underlying interest” that 
causes the harm; in this case, the concern for human rights articulated 
in the CHRP, which is shared by the buyer, consumers of the buyer’s 
goods and, of course, the affected third parties.161  Employing a form 
of restorative compensation through liquidated damages has the 
potential to avoid the problems of liquidated damages that might 
overcompensate the buyer (and appear to exact a penalty) by 
transferring some or all of the recovery to the affected third parties.162  
Moreover, the recovery can help remediate the damage to the buyer’s 
reputation by benefitting human rights in some way, perhaps even the 
                                               
 157. See id. at 1939 n.123 (explaining that victims can be compensated for emotional 
harm through restoration damages); see also Model Contract Clauses, supra note 17, ¶ 5.4. 
 158. Ben-Shahar & Porat, supra note 13, at 1939. 
 159. See UNGPs, supra note 31, princ. 22 & cmt., at 24–25 (explaining that “[w]here 
adverse impacts have occurred that the business enterprise has not caused or contributed 
to, but which are directly linked to its operations, products or services by a business 
relationship, the responsibility to respect human rights does not require that the 
enterprise itself provide for remediation, though it may take a role in doing so”). 
 160. See Ben-Shahar & Porat, supra note 13, at 1904. 
 161. Id. at 1915–17. 
 162. See id. at 1938 (reasoning that “directing some punitive damages to 
nonplaintiffs,” such as the third parties actually affected by human rights violations, 
could have the same effect as restoration damages). 
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communities impacted by the breach of the CHRP.163  While 
measurement of such a restoration remedy might be troublesome for 
courts, a liquidated damages clause would allow the parties to fix an 
amount agreed, in advance, to compensate for the types of human 
rights harm that could damage the buyer’s reputation.164 
Professor Dadush takes a similar position, noting that the remedy for 
damage to “another’s—or many others’—suffering” may require a 
“different kind of remedy.”165  While Professor Dadush acknowledges 
that compensation for contractual breach typically takes the form of 
traditional money damages to the aggrieved party, she also asserts that 
compensation focused on the “original promise” in the form of 
“reparations” may better “repair the damage done.”166  Addressing the 
traditional notion that focuses on recovery of a market value to redress 
harm, she counters that alternative reparation-oriented “remedies 
would be beneficial for the consumer, but also for those injured by the 
broken virtuous promise—e.g., the planet or the people involved in 
making the identity-harming product.”167  Her position would seem to 
support an argument favoring a liquidated damages clause that directs 
compensation to those impacted by human rights abuses in the supply 
chain because remedies should “address the actual harm-in-the-world 
created by broken virtuous promises.”168 
These arguments in favor of reconstructing damages for 
“emotional” or “identity” harms are sound and can be applied to 
liquidated damages for breach of a CHRP.  First, the harm from breach 
of the CHRP emanates from the impact on human rights in the 
affected communities.  It is the harm to the affected communities that 
causes emotional or identity harm to consumers who purchase the 
                                               
 163. See id. at 1919 (discussing the difficulty of identifying the manner in which to 
compensate the particular cause affected). 
 164. See id. (positing that measurement of the “intensity of emotional harm” is 
difficult for courts in the absence of a liquidated damages provision).  Professors Ben-
Shahar and Porat distinguish cy pres, which focuses on societal goals, and restoration, 
which compensates for emotional harm.  Id.  at 1936–37. 
 165. Dadush, Identity Harm, supra note 13, at 895. 
 166. Id. at 933 (urging that “[i]dentity harm thus demands injunctive relief,” which 
is best achieved by compelling a company to satisfy its human rights pledge). 
 167. Dadush, The Law of Identity Harm, supra note 13, at 848. 
 168. Id. at 850 (arguing that the “right measure” of recovery for breach of a promise 
of an environmentally friendly car would be the “lost greenness of the purchase” with 
compensation placed in a “climate mitigation fund”). 
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goods.169  In turn, this collectively leads to damage to the reputation to 
the buyer, even where the buyer has in place a contractually obligated 
CHRP and, hopefully, has worked with the supplier to mitigate the 
impact.170  Second, the buyer should avoid being seen as benefitting 
from a supplier’s human rights abuse by directly receiving large 
liquidated damages.171  Moreover, the parties’ agreement to a 
reasonable liquidated damages clause that provides for the bulk of the 
remedy to be paid to repair “the underlying [human rights] interest” 
harmed by the breach, obviates the difficulty courts face in 
determining reparations.172  Thus, neither difficulty of determination 
nor unreasonably large damages resembling penalties should be at 
issue if the liquidated damages clause directs at least part of the 
recovery to those affected by human rights abuses. 
C.   Return, Destruction, or Donation of Goods  
is Consistent with Mitigation Principles 
In some cases, the buyer will have possession of goods that are the 
subject of broken CHRP promises.  What should the buyer do with 
these goods?  This question represents a remaining challenge 
regarding breach of a CHRP in the supply chain. 
The MCCs permit the buyer to store, return, and reship them back 
to the seller, or, if permitted by applicable law, destroy or donate the 
goods.173  Destroying and donating goods tainted by human rights 
abuses presents two particular issues.  First, is destroying or donating 
goods is consistent with notions disfavoring penalties and favoring 
                                               
 169. See id. at 809 (broken sustainability promises produces the most “egregious 
instances of identity harm”). 
 170. See UNGPs, supra note 31, princ. 19 & cmt., at 20–22 (illustrating that even when 
a business integrates its commitments to human rights protections throughout its 
enterprise, and takes steps to “cease,” “prevent,” and “mitigate” any adverse human 
rights impacts, it should be prepared to “accept any consequences—reputational, 
financial, or legal”). 
 171. See id. princ. 17 & cmt., at 17–18 (“As a non-legal matter, business enterprises 
may be perceived as being ‘complicit’ in the acts of another party where, for example, 
they are seen to benefit from an abuse committed by that party.”). 
 172. See Dadush, The Law of Identity Harm, supra note 13, at 851 (quoting Ben-Shahar 
& Porat, supra note 13, at 1905) (arguing that this method is preferable because it 
provides sincere plaintiffs a mechanism to address intangible harms)). 
 173. Model Contract Clauses, supra note 17, ¶ 5.5. 
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mitigation?174  Second, will destroying or donating goods prevent 
damages?175  Both of these questions are answered in the affirmative. 
Most sales of goods cases, whether based on buyer or seller recovery, 
reject any position that allows for the recovery of consequential 
damages where there is question as to the aggrieved party’s acts in 
mitigation.  For example, in Packgen v. Berry Plastics Corp.,176 the court 
denied a seller’s motion for summary judgment where the seller did 
not send the buyer a non-conformance report identifying problems 
with the material until a month after the last purchase order, which 
suggested a “factual issue as to whether the buyer could have 
reasonably prevented the [lost profit] damages by cover or 
otherwise.”177  A similar case arising in the seller’s context is Knitcraft 
Corp. v. Raleigh Ltd.,178 where the seller did not attempt to resell after 
the buyer’s breach, but held the garments in a warehouse for several 
years and later donated them to charity.179  The trial court denied the 
seller’s request for recovery of the price, finding that the seller did not 
mitigate its damages through a reasonable resale.180 
These cases are correct, but application of the policy varies with 
respect to supplier’s breach of a CHRP and, thereby, the buyer’s 
treatment of the goods.  It might appear that actions such as destroying 
goods or donating them might work as a penalty to a seller who is then 
unable to recover the goods.  It might be argued, then, that the buyer 
that destroys or donates the goods has failed to act in mitigation and 
should be barred from recover of at least consequential damages.181  
                                               
 174. U.C.C. § 1-305 cmt. 1 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2011) (stating that this 
provision is to “make it clear that compensatory damages are limited to compensation”); see 
also CISG, supra note 3, art. 77 (parties “must . . . mitigate the loss”); id. art. 84 (providing for 
an accounting of benefits to that the buyer has obtained from the goods). 
 175. U.C.C. § 2-715 cmt. 2 (stating that consequential damages cannot be recovered 
if not minimized); CISG, supra note 3, art. 77. 
 176. 113 F. Supp. 3d 371 (D. Me. 2015). 
 177. Id. at 398–99; see also Fed. Mogul Corp. v. UTi, U.S., Inc., No. 601271/2010, 2015 
WL 3989027, at *8–10 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 1, 2015), aff’d sub nom. Fed.-Mogul Corp. v. UTi, 
U.S., Inc., 45 N.Y.S.3d 401 (App. Div. 2017) (continuing to utilize the services of other 
shipping services was not mitigation caused by Defendant’s breach).  Although Federal 
Mogul Corp. involved a service contract, the court noted that the mitigation analysis 
applied was the same as under the Uniform Commercial Code.  Id. at *8 n.12. 
 178. No. 49A04-1007-CC-397, 2011 WL 676166 (Ind. Ct. App. Feb. 25, 2011). 
 179. Id. at *1. 
 180. Id. 
 181. U.C.C. § 2-715 cmt. 2 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2011) (stating that 
consequential damages cannot be recovered if not minimized); CISG, supra note 3, 
art. 77 (damages are reduced where there is a failure to mitigate). 
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While destroying or donating the goods might be troublesome in other 
cases, the buyer will arguably experience increased harm to its 
reputation if goods tainted with human rights abuses are available in the 
marketplace.  As such, actions preventing goods tainted with human 
rights abuses from entering the marketplace may work in mitigation of 
damages, rather than as a penalty to the supplier.  Accordingly, actions 
taken to destroy or donate the goods under the MCCs are consistent 
with the policies favoring compensation and mitigation. 
IV.    APPLICATION OF THE MCCS 
Part II of this Article demonstrated the measurement and 
verification problems arising from violations of a contractually 
obligated CHRP in a supply chain subject to default remedies.  These 
problems result in significant difficulties in the event that a buyer 
pursues monetary remedies, particularly those related to 
consequential damages, including damages to reputation.  Part III 
argued that inclusion of specialized remedies provisions, like those in 
the MCCs, enhance remediation and mitigation of human rights 
abuses, as well as working in favor of mitigating the buyer’s damages.  
There is a potential to agree to liquidate damages to the buyer’s 
reputation by stipulating a reasonable amount.  Moreover, there is an 
opportunity to address, through a liquidated damages clause, the root 
cause of the buyer’s reputational damage, the adverse human rights 
impact, by using a “reparations” form of recovery that would benefit 
adversely affected communities. 
Part IV now offers a demonstration of two possible applications of the 
MCCs on remedies.  Returning first to the hypothetical soccer balls 
stitched by children, this section shows that the basic measure of 
monetary damages to the buyer on the whole remains unchanged.  
Application of the MCCs, though, has potential for the buyer’s 
mitigation and remediation of human rights impacts in a way that is 
“[l]egally [e]ffective and [o]perationally [l]ikely.”182  Moreover, the 
treatment of goods tainted by human rights abuses provides clarification 
to the default position on treatment of non-conforming goods. 
                                               
 182. Model Contract Clauses, supra note 17, at 1094. 
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A.   The Soccer Ball Stitchers  
Suppose a commercial seller and buyer make a long-term supply 
contract for the purchase of soccer balls at $6 per ball.183  The buyer, 
located in the United States, has a CHRP as a foundation for all 
supplier agreements, to which all suppliers must adhere.  The CHRP, 
among other provisions, includes standards for leadership, prohibits 
labor by those under the age of sixteen, and remedies provisions of the 
type drafted in the MCCs.184  The supply contract includes liquidated 
damages for violations of the CHRP.  The damages are calculated to 
represent the anticipated annual profit from the supply contract, and, 
the liquidated damages will be paid to one or more entities, protecting 
children and trafficked persons, designated in the supply contract.185 
After arrival of the soccer balls, the buyer discovers that the seller, 
located in Pakistan, is employing ball stitchers who are under the age 
of sixteen and as young as ten years old.  Moreover, due to this 
pervasive use of child labor, the buyer experiences negative news 
coverage, lost sales, and reputational damages.186 
The MCCs provide the buyer several remedial options short of 
cancellation and damages, which are both available in full.  The first 
step may likely be an investigation to determine what response is 
                                               
 183. See supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text.  While there is history of human 
rights abuses in the sporting goods industry, including child stitchers of soccer balls, 
FIFA banned use of child labor in 1998.  See Jessica Phelan, 6 Times Human Rights Were 
Violated in the Name of Soccer, PRI (May 29, 2015, 4:15 AM), https://www.pri 
.org/stories/2015-05-29/6-times-human-rights-were-violated-name-soccer (explaining 
a 1996 study that discovered “more than 7000 children . . . stitching soccer balls full 
time,” which forced FIFA to adopt a “code of conduct banning the use of child labor 
by its contractors and subcontractors”).  But see Annabel Symington, One Man’s Dream 
Comes True:  Making the Official Ball for the 2014 FIFA World Cup, PRI (Apr. 24, 2014, 7:23 
AM), https://www.pri.org/stories/2014-04-24/one-mans-dream-come-true-making-
official-ball-2014-fifa-world-cup (noting that child labor in problematic in Pakistan and 
that it is difficult to determine sometimes which goods are the product of child labor).  
The particular soccer ball scenario in this Article is hypothetical and not related to any 
particular sporting goods company. 
 184. See supra Part III and accompanying text. 
 185. This Article takes no position on the precise calculation of liquidated damages, 
holding that discussion as part of the research agenda of another article discussing 
more fully the underpinnings and challenges of liquidating damages in the human 
rights context.  The one-year profits are used for illustration only. 
 186. See Dadush, The Law of Identity Harm, supra note 13, at 842–44 (discussing 
consumer lawsuits brought against companies purportedly undertaking human rights 
protections and arguing that misleading statements to such effect may be the basis for 
later consumer claims). 
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appropriate.187  The MCCs provide the buyer with the right to withhold 
payments on the supply contract at this point, which is earlier than may 
be permitted under the default provisions.188  To the extent the 
relationship is one the buyer believes it can remediate, the right to 
demand termination of the child workers, supervisors, and others can 
provide leverage over suppliers.189  Similarly, in the event that trouble 
emanates from a particular subcontractor in the supply chain, the 
buyer would have the ability to insist that the seller terminate that 
supply chain to remediate the human rights impact.190  The buyer 
would have access to injunctive relief in response to risk of future 
breaches, sales of the tainted goods or the like.191 
In the event that initial equitable remedies prove insufficient toward 
remediation, the MCCs preserve several options to the buyer.  The 
buyer could claim damages for purchasing other soccer balls or 
market-based damages.192  For instance, if replacement soccer balls cost 
$8 per ball, the buyer could recover the difference between the cover 
price of $8 and the contract price of $6, for a differential of $2 per ball.  
Similar analysis would apply if the buyer does not cover and the market 
price for balls is $8, such that the buyer could recover $2 per ball again.  
This result is arguably the same as would occur under the default 
provisions of Article 2 in light of the prohibitions on penalties that 
guard against the enhancement of the buyer’s damages.193 
There are two primary differences with the application of the MCCs 
arising from breach of the CHRP in the soccer ball contract:  
liquidated damages194 and duties with respect to the goods.195  First, the 
MCCs would operate here to stipulate damages for reputation keyed 
to the amount of annual profits under the contract, and would be 
payable to a designated group in the community affected by the breach 
                                               
 187. Model Contract Clauses, supra note 17, ¶ 5.2.  The buyer can also demand 
adequate assurances from the supplier.  Id. ¶ 5.3(a); see also UNGPs, supra note 31, 
princs. 18–19, at 19–22 and accompanying commentary (noting that determining the 
appropriate action includes an evaluation of the relationship, whether leverage is 
available and whether termination is needed). 
 188. Model Contract Clauses, supra note 17, ¶ 5.2; see supra Part II and accompanying text. 
 189. Model Contract Clauses, supra note 17, ¶ 5.3(c). 
 190. Id. ¶ 5.3(d). 
 191. Id. ¶ 5.3(b). 
 192. Id. ¶¶ 5.3(g), 5.4; see supra Part III and accompanying text. 
 193. See supra Part II and accompanying text. 
 194. Model Contract Clauses, supra note 17, ¶ 5.4; see supra Part III and accompanying text. 
 195. Model Contract Clauses, supra note 17, ¶ 5.5; see supra Part III and accompanying text. 
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of the CHRP, such as Child Rights Connect,196 UNICEF,197 or 
Humanium.198  Second, the buyer has the limited duty with respect to 
the goods.  In the case of the soccer balls, they likely bear a trademark 
of the buyer upon delivery, such that return might not be the preferred 
option.  The buyer in this case may likely choose to destroy the soccer 
balls or donate them (likely with a special mark) to mitigate damages 
to its reputation if the goods enter the marketplace. 
Analyzing whether the liquidated damages provision would be void 
as a penalty in the soccer balls hypothetical turns on reasonableness of 
the amount.199  Why would the parties agree to liquidated damages tied 
to the annual profit under the contract with recovery paid to affected 
communities, rather than to the buyer itself?  The reason would 
seldom be to confer some type of windfall on the buyer beyond the 
actual loss to the buyer’s reputation from the breach of the CHRP; 
parties normally do not make contracts with this in mind.200  Rather, 
the typical purpose of these parties making the contract is the supply 
of the soccer balls, with the understanding that the CHRP mandates 
the supply be done without negative human rights impacts. 
With this in mind, it would be likely that the parties would enter into 
a liquidated damages stipulation in an amount linked in some way to 
profit under the contract.  Damages measured in this way would seek 
to remedy the precise type of harm caused by the breach of the CHRP, 
which, in turn, caused reputational and other damages to the buyer.  
The buyer, for its part, could be persuaded to enter into this type of 
liquidated damages provision, since:  (1) the buyer has already made a 
commitment to protection of human rights through adoption of the 
                                               
 196. See CHILD RTS. CONNECT, https://www.childrightsconnect.org (last visited June 
1, 2019) (working with national, regional and international groups). 
 197. See, What We Do, UNICEF, https://www.unicef.org/pakistan/what-we-do (last 
visited June 1, 2019) (conducting operations in Pakistan). 
 198. See Children of Pakistan, HUMANIUM, https://www.humanium.org/en/pakistan 
(last visited June 1, 2019) (working in Pakistan). 
 199. U.C.C. § 2-718(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2011); see CISG Advisory 
Council Opinion No. 10, supra note 57, cmt. 4.2.2.; see also Robert A. Hillman, The Limits 
of Behavioral Decision Theory in Legal Analysis:  The Case of Liquidated Damages, 85 CORNELL 
L. REV. 717, 731 (2000) (finding that contracting parties are actually too optimistic on 
the success of the venture to bargain for an “effective liquidated damages provision”). 
 200. See Hillman, supra note 199, at 733 (“The parties’ focus on achieving a ‘fair’ 
exchange and their aversion to windfalls and penalties also may point to enforcement 
of agreed remedies.”); see also Ben-Shahar & Porat, supra note 13, at 1911–12, 1912 
n.47 (observing that when strong “emotional interest[s]” are written into contract 
provisions, they “render[] damages inadequate” and “hard-to-measure”). 
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CHRP;201 (2) the buyer has implemented the CHRP’s policy 
commitment into specific action with the MCCs;202 and (3) the buyer 
may suffer additional damage to its reputation if it is “seen to benefit 
from an abuse committed” by another party.203  Moreover, by not 
retaining the recovery from the liquidated damages, the buyer has not 
received any windfall or exacted a penalty from the seller. 
Similarly, a decision to destroy or donate the soccer balls should be 
defensible.  Decisions of a contracting party that deprive the other 
party of the goods can expose the non-breaching party to arguments 
that its damages should be limited due to a failure to mitigate.204  The 
buyer’s action in donating or destroying goods tainted by human rights 
abuses may be considered an action in mitigation of damages.  First, a 
buyer faced with reputational damages arising from the seller’s breach 
of the CHRP will, presumably, suffer increased damages if the tainted 
goods enter into the marketplace.  There, conscious consumers will not 
be able to distinguish which goods of the seller are tainted and which 
are not, particularly if the balls bear the buyer’s trademarks.  Second, a 
seller would not suffer a penalty if the buyer donating or destroying the 
goods actually reduces the amount of damage to the buyer. 
In short, inclusion of provisions, such as the liquidating damages 
clause and permitting the destruction of the goods, do not indicate 
that a penalty may arise for one party or that a party has failed to 
mitigate its damages.  Rather, the buyer would have measures available 
to mitigate damages and remediate adverse human rights impacts in 
the supply chain.  Damages in the case of the soccer ball stitchers would 
be based on an amount necessary to compensate the buyer’s general 
expectation damages and result in mitigation of reputation and 
human rights harms.  This would be true even where at least part of 
the recovery under a liquidated damages provision is paid to causes 
benefitting the affected communities, as this can be seen as mitigation 
of the buyer’s reputational harm (as well as mitigating harm to value-
conscious consumers).  This measure of damages would be consistent 
with the notion of permitting alteration of damages that do not 
enhance recovery or act as penalties. 
                                               
 201. See UNGPs, supra note 31, princ. 15 & cmt., at 15–16; see supra notes 55–59 and 
accompanying text. 
 202. See UNGPs, supra note 31, princ. 15 & cmt., at 15–16. 
 203. Id. princ. 17 & cmt., at 17–18. 
 204. See supra notes 70, 143, 170 and accompanying text. 
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Consider now the following hypothetical to examine whether this 
position holds true in a transaction where the human rights abuse affects 
the whole goods but arises from the acts of only one supplier in the chain. 
B.   The Cell Phone Component 
Suppose a commercial seller and buyer make a long-term supply contract 
for the purchase of cell phones at $400 per phone.  The buyer, located in the 
United States, has a CHRP as a foundation for all supplier agreements, to 
which all suppliers must adhere.  The CHRP, among other provisions, 
includes standards for leadership, prohibits trafficking in persons and labor 
by those under the age of sixteen, and remedies provisions of the type drafted 
in the MCCs.205  The supply contract includes liquidated damages for 
violations of the CHRP calculated in an amount representing the annual 
profit on the supply contract.  The contract specifies that any recovery of 
liquidated damages will be paid to one or more entities protecting children 
and trafficked persons designated in the supply contract. 
After arrival of the cell phones, the buyer discovers that the batteries 
in the phones contain cobalt that was mined by trafficked persons and 
children in the Congo.  The cobalt was supplied by a single supplier in 
the supply chain several steps removed from the seller.  The buyer is 
faced with unfavorable news coverage, lost sales of phones and other 
electronics it produces, and damage to its reputation due to the use of 
trafficked and child labor in its supply chain.206 
Much of the same analysis can be made here as in the soccer ball stitchers 
hypothetical in terms of access to non-monetary and monetary remedies, 
with two primary differences.  First, if the buyer is unable to work with the 
seller to eliminate the human rights abuses of the supplier, the MCCs provide 
the buyer with the leverage to force the termination of the subcontract, which 
is the point of the CHRP breach.  Second, while donation or destruction 
seemed to be the probable treatment of tainted soccer balls, with the cell 
phones there may be the opening to return the goods to the seller for 
remediation of the goods to eliminate the parts that contain the cobalt.  The 
MCCs provide the buyer with traditional monetary damages, but the 
                                               
 205. See supra Part III and accompanying text. 
 206. See Dadush, The Law of Identity Harm, supra note 13, at 809–10 (discussing 
consumer lawsuits brought against companies purportedly undertaking human rights 
protections and arguing that misleading statements to such effect may be the basis for 
later consumer claims). 
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flexibility of the non-monetary damages and the treatment of tainted goods 
may provide clarity in the event of a CHRP violation.207  
CONCLUSION 
Access to contractual remedies under the expectation interest 
applies equally to breaches of CHRP that parties implement in the 
supply chain by operative contractual obligations.  More specifically, 
the aggrieved party’s access to a contractual remedy upon discovery of 
human rights abuses and impacts in the supply chain depends upon 
whether a buyer has not only adopted a CHRP but also has made it 
contractually obligated in the supply chain, typically through 
representations and warranties.  One purpose of this Article has been to 
explore the reach of contractual remedies for human rights abuses in the 
supply chain and the need to put basic corporate policy into action so that 
buyers in the supply chain are not complicit in human rights abuses. 
This Article has attempted to show that there are sufficient 
consequences that follow a breach of contractually obligated CHRP in 
terms of preservation of a remedy to the aggrieved buyer.  First, 
exploring the application of Article 2’s default remedial structure and 
its limitations on the expectation interest and consequential damages 
should lead to a better understanding of why a buyer desiring to 
implement its CHRP in the supply chain should prefer to alter the 
default remedies.  Second, this Article evaluates the MCCs, 
demonstrating where the clauses resolve limitations under Article 2’s 
default rules and where they do not.  The Article emphasizes that there 
is little to enhance the recovery by a buyer arising from breach of a 
CHRP and suggests the possibility of avoiding characterization of 
                                               
 207. This Article has demonstrated that the MCCs are compliant with the default 
rules of the UCC and CISG, and provide specialized solutions with flexibility to 
contracting parties in a format that makes the provisions “legally effective and 
operationally likely.”  Model Contract Clauses, supra note 17, at 1094.  Yet, there is much 
here that is the basis for my next article looking more closely at the use of liquidated 
damages as part of the enforcement of CHRPs.  That piece will explore the remedial 
principles of contract law to further outline how liquidated damages can be used as a 
private law remedy for human rights abuses.  It will explain how parties might 
determine the amount of liquidated damages, why buyers should not attempt to cast 
clauses for breach of a CHRP as “alternative performance” provisions, and recommend 
approaches to CHRP violations, particularly where both parties might contribute to 
the CHRP violation.  This involves the potential for at least a portion of any such 
damages to flow through to those harmed by CHRP violations.  But, as set out in this 
Article, buyers should not be perceived as profiting from human rights abuses. 
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liquidated damages as penalties by providing a form of reparations to 
communities harmed by human rights impacts in the supply chain. 
This Article strives to present a balanced application of remedial 
contract clauses, whether those presented in the MCCs or not, that 
preserves the aggrieved buyer’s right to elect its remedy in most cases, 
subject to a limit on the buyer achieving the position equivalent to full 
contractual performance only.  To the extent that selection and 
drafting of remedial provisions implementing a CHRP in a supply 
chain contract depend upon an understanding of the expectation 
interest without falling victim to common limitations related to 
windfalls, mitigation, penalties, and the like, it is hopeful that this 
Article will aid in the recourse to remedies generally and the 
assessment of damages in the instance of a supplier’s violation of a 
contractually obligated CHRP. 
